

## FIN 540 Repurchase Tender Offers

1. **Cash flow out of the firm to shareholders**
  - alternative to dividend payments
  - before recent changes in the tax laws, capital gains were taxed at lower rates (so this was better than dividends for making payments to shareholders)
  - unless all shareholders tender all of their shares, the payments to shareholders are not in proportion to stockholdings
2. **Usually there is a premium offered to induce shareholders to sell**
  - to realize capital gains and pay taxes

## RPO's: How Should Stock Prices Behave?

### "Cash-box model of the firm"

- firm's asset is a box of cash (\$10 million)
- pre-offer price per share = \$10 (1 million shares)
- buy-back 20% of shares @ 20% premium (200,000 shares @ \$12)
- post-expiration of the offer stock price is  $[(\$10 - \$2.4)/.8] = \$9.50$

**RPO's:  
Cash Box Model (cont.)**

- equivalent to paying a special \$.50 dividend and retiring 200,000 shares

**During the offer period the price should stay at \$10**

- each 100 shares of stock bought for \$10 would be worth 80 shares at \$9.50 plus 20 shares at \$12 (\$1,000)
- all shares should be tendered so that each shareholder will receive his pro-rationed share of the "dividend"

**RPO's:  
Cash Box Model (cont.)**

**NOTE: this is a purely financial transaction (paying cash out of the company)**

- the ex-dividend price of the stock equals the original stock price minus the implied dividend
- there is no information effect

## **RPO's: Information Effect**

**If management thinks the stock is undervalued,  
it is willing to pay a premium for the stock**

- **opposite of a seasoned equity offering**
- **often, management or insiders choose not to participate in the offer**

## **Summary of Evidence on Repurchase Tender Offers**

### **Dann's JFE paper:**

- **20% premium for 15% of the stock**
- **14.6% of shares outstanding acquired (18% tendered!)**
- **duration of offer 22 trading days (one month)**
- **2-day announcement return to stock = 15%**
- **small (2-3%) drop in CAR after 20 trading days = ex-dividend effect**

## **Dann's JFE paper on RPO's**

**Small downward drift in CAR in the 40 days  
before the offer is announced**

- **price remains about 12% above pre-offer price  
after the offer expires**
- **not a wealth transfer from bondholders**
- **convertible bond and stock prices rise, straight  
bond prices stay the same**

## **Vermaelen's JFE paper on RPO's**

**Similar behavior for RPO's**

- **except no downward drift before the offer**

**243 open market repurchases follow -5%  
downward drift in prices before announcement,  
and a 2-3% announcement effect**

- **these don't offer a premium, so there is no ex-  
dividend effect and a smaller information effect**
- **earnings behavior is much better in 5 years after  
repurchase than in 5 years before**

## **Masulis' J Fin paper on RPO's**

**-5% stock price reaction when oversubscribed  
and firm doesn't decide to buy all shares (pro-  
rata purchase)**

- relatively bad news

## **Comment & Jarrell J Fin paper on Dutch Auction RPO's**

**97 fixed price and 72 Dutch Auction RPO's; 1,197  
open market repurchase authorizations from 1984-  
89**

### **Dutch auction:**

- firm specifies number of shares it wants to purchase and range of prices
- shareholders tender shares with minimum acceptable price
- firm sets repurchase price by finding lowest price that will yield number of shares sought

## Signaling by Insiders in RPO's

**3-day announcement return is larger for fixed price offers**

•8.3% vs. 7.5%

**offer premiums are larger (in %) for smaller firms**

•Lakonishok & Vermaelen (JFin, 1990): 24.3% for smallest quintile vs. 8.3% for largest quintile

**announcement effect is larger if officers & directors forego a large "dividend"**

## Stock Price Reaction to Self-Tender Announcements (Table 5)

Open market & tender offers combined, 3-day return:

constant =	.68%	(t=2.15)
Dutch auction =	1.77%	(t=1.67)
fixed price =	2.18%	(t=1.49)
O&D "at risk" =	5.03%	(t=3.64)
max % sought =	.20	(t=6.48)
prior 40 day		
excess return =	-.09	(t=-5.04)
current market		
return =	1.15	(t=27.2)
R-squared =	.448	(N=1,284)

## Repurchase Tender Offers: Summary

- (1) "Cash box" model of the firm doesn't explain the facts
  - stock price jumps when premium RPO is announced
  - "ex-dividend" effect occurs after offer expires, but price remains about 12% above pre-offer price
  
- (2) Information/signaling effect of RPO's is greater when insiders say they are foregoing the dividend
  - lower, on avg, in Dutch auction offers

## Repurchase Tender Offers: Questions

- (1) Why would a firm buy back 20% of its stock? (at a 20% premium?)
  
- (2) Is a premium RPO an alternative to a cash dividend for disgorging cash?
  - Do shareholders receive the dividend in proportion to ownership?
  - Does it matter?
  
- (3) What are the corporate control implications of a large RPO?
  - Is it a partial LBO?

## **Return to FIN 540 Home Page**

**<http://schwert.ssb.rochester.edu/f540/f540.htm>**